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I. INTRODUCTION 
Somali Bantu refugees deported against their will from the United States 
are shackled in chains during their removal to Somalia. Ancestors of the 
Somali Bantu deportees were similarly chained on their journey to Somalia 
as victims of the Sultan of Zanzibar’s East African slave trade nearly 200 
years ago. 
In 2003, the first of 12,000 minority Somali Bantu refugees who were 
long-resident in Kenyan refugee camps were legally resettled in the 
United States under its Refugee Admissions Program Process Priority 2 
as a group of “special humanitarian concern.”1 Since 2016, dozens of 
Somali Bantu men have been removed from the United States to 
Somalia, where they rarely have relatives outside of regions controlled 
by the U.S. Department of State-designated terrorist group Al Shabaab.2 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, https://
www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
 
. (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
Of those deportees interviewed, most were either born in Kenya or 
arrived there as infants so Somalia’s dominant culture and language are 
foreign to them.3 The U.S. Department of State’s 2017 country report 
describes Somalia’s minorities as, “. . . disproportionately subjected to 
killings, torture, rape, [and] kidnapping for ransom” carried out “with 
impunity by faction militias and Majority clan members, often with the 
acquiescence of federal and local authorities.”4 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. AND LAB., SOMALIA 2017 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT 36 (2018), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277289.pdf. 
Survey results from the 
Somali Bantu deportees reveal that most were kidnapped and tortured 
for ransom by uniformed Somali police or armed groups that the Somali 
Government was unwilling or unable to control. Some were kidnapped 
and tortured for ransom upon arrival at the Mogadishu International 
Airport (MIA) by Somali government security personnel5 while others 
were taken within weeks of arriving in Somalia. American government 
analysis and survey results from Somali Bantu deportees provides evi-
dence that permitting their removal to Somalia violates Article 3 of the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture. 
1. Heidi H. Boas, The New Face of America’s Refugees: African Refugee Resettlement to the 
United States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 431, 446 (Spring 2007). 
2.
3. Of the 18 deportees interviewed, only 27.3 percent of the youngest 12, who are 28 years old or 
younger, speak the dominant Somali Maxaa language. 
4.
5. The term, “Somali government security personnel,” includes Somali police, military, airport cus-
toms officers and the regional Jubbaland State police in Kismayu. 
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A. Rationale for the Study 
The survey results in this paper provide data on the torture and the fear 
of torture experienced by Somali Bantu deportees in East Africa. This 
data is intended to directly address the question of whether removing 
Somali Bantu refugees to Somalia puts them in danger of being subjected 
to torture and is, therefore, in violation of Article 3 of the Convention 
against Torture. The survey results highlight examples of political inse-
curity in Somalia as well as historical human rights abuses against the 
Somali Bantu. The survey data, in combination with analyses by the 
United States government, the United Nations, and human rights organi-
zations, strengthen the contention that current United States law does not 
properly consider the reality of torture and persecution suffered by the 
Somali Bantu. 
B. Methodology 
Interviews were conducted with Somali Bantu deportees who 
were removed to Somalia after arriving legally in the United States as 
refugees over ten years ago. The interviews took 30 to 90 minutes to 
complete and were conducted by phone by one of the authors, Daniel J. 
Van Lehman, in English and Swahili between September 6, 2018 and 
December 29, 2018. Research protocols were approved by an Institutional 
Review Board. 
Contact information was obtained on 22 of the approximately 35 to 45 
Somali Bantu who have been deported to Somalia since 2016. Eighteen 
deportees were interviewed, and information was obtained about two others 
from interviewees who were deported together with them, for a total sample 
size of 20. Only two deportees in addition to these 20 in the sample refused to 
be interviewed, resulting in a minimum response rate of 90.9% (AAPOR 
Response Rate 3). The snowball sample represents a large proportion of the 
total eligible population (at least 44%), which is not more than 45 individuals. 
The whereabouts and survival of those who could not be reached is 
unknown. 
Somali Bantu deportees were interviewed between one and 24 months 
after their arrival in Mogadishu, Somalia. For those deportees who were 
interviewed shortly after arrival, there is a high probability that they 
will attempt the journey from Mogadishu to Kenya via Kismayu. There 
is an attendant probability that, over time, these deportees will experi-
ence abuse, which would likely increase the rates of deportee torture 
described herein. Several deportees reported that other Somali Bantu 
deportees were kidnapped and executed in Somalia, but were unable to 
provide victim details, which excluded these cases from the survey 
results. 
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II. THE SOMALI BANTU PEOPLE 
A. Description of the Somali Bantu People 
Somalia’s constitution structures its “4.5” electoral representation system 
along ethnic lines by grouping all Somalis into one of five clan categories.6 
Somalia is not a homogeneous country, and those Somalis who do not belong 
genealogically to one of the four Majority or “Noble” clans are listed as 
belonging in the Minority category. The Minorities have “a different— 
usually mixed—parentage, with some Asian, Oromo or Bantu ancestors.”7 
Among the most discriminated against of these Minority groups are the tradi-
tionally farming Somali Bantu (also known as Jareer), who originate in the 
Jubba and Shabeele River Valleys; the light-skinned traditionally mercantile 
Barawa people native to the southern Indian Ocean coastal city of Barawa; 
and the traditionally maritime Bajuni people indigenous to Kismayu and the 
Bajuun Islands.8 In contrast, most Majority-clan Somalis share a common 
ethnic heritage, religion, and nomad-influenced culture.9 
The Somali Bantu people, who “heavily occupy” the southernmost nine of 
the country’s 18 regions,10 can be divided into two groups. The first is indige-
nous to southern Somalia. This group is thought to have migrated to Somalia 
thousands of years ago and is regarded as the remnants of a pre-Somali popu-
lation.11 Since then, this population survived as a maroon community among 
the nomadic Majority clans. The second group of Somali Bantu, to which the 
deportees belong, are the descendants of the nineteenth-century East African 
slave trade.12 Regardless of their heritage, both groups suffer similar preju-
dice in Somali society. 
There are several observable characteristics that Majority-clan Somalis 
use to distinguish a Somali Bantu. The Somali Bantu predominantly speak 
minority languages, notably Maay Maay, Zigua, and Swahili, which the 
Maxaa-speaking Majority-clan Somalis rarely speak. Physically, the Somali 
Bantu’s distinct Negroid features elicit derogatory terms such as jareer 
(kinky hair), sankadhuthi (big nose), and adoon (slave) from Majority-clan 
Somalis.13 Also, the Somali Bantu are predominantly excluded from profes-
sional positions in the Somali government, non-governmental organizations, 
6. MOHAMED A. ENO, THE BANTU-JAREER SOMALIS: UNEARTHING APARTHEID IN THE HORN OF 
AFRICA 13 (Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2008). 
7. LEE CASSANELLI, IMMIGR. & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., VICTIMS AND VULNERABLE GROUPS IN 
SOUTHERN SOMALIA (1995). 
8. MARTIN HILL, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INTERNATIONAL, NO REDRESS: SOMALIA’S FORGOTTEN 
MINORITIES 8-13, (2010). 
9. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4, at 36. 
10. Id. 
11. ENO, supra note 6, at 66. 
12. Id. at 93; DANIEL J. LEHMAN, RESETTLEMENT OF THE MUSHUNGULI: SOMALI REFUGEES OF 
SOUTHEAST AFRICAN ORIGIN 2, (Paper sent to the Fifth International Congress of Somali Studies, Holy 
Cross College, 1-3 December 1993). (With Permission of the UNHCR Country Representative in 
Nairobi). 
13. ENO, supra note 6, at 15. 
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and business. Jobs considered beneath the Majority clans are largely reserved 
for the Somali Bantu, including crop farming, the building trades, the me-
chanical trades, and difficult manual labor.14 
B. Historical Persecution in Somalia – 1840 to 1960 
In the 19th Century, the Sultanate of Zanzibar enslaved approximately 
50,000 of the Somali Bantu’s ancestors in present-day Tanzania, 
Mozambique, and Malawi.15 The Bantu slaves were brought to Somalia 
where they were sold to Majority-clan Somali plantation owners in the 
Shabelle River Valley. Somali Bantu slaves who either escaped captivity or 
were manumitted relocated to arable and sparsely populated areas on the 
banks of the heavily forested Jubba River. Over the course of the late 19th 
century, the Somali Bantu defended themselves against re-enslavement by 
Majority-clan Somalis.16 
In the early 1930s, the Italian colonial authorities deemed Somalia’s Jubba 
River Valley suitable for the development and exploitation of large-scale 
agriculture. The colonists, determined to establish large agricultural planta-
tions, forced the Somali Bantu to work as farmers and confiscated their 
land.17 This draconian kolonyo program, initiated in 1935, was made possible 
with the assistance of former slave-owning Majority-clan Somalis. Kolonyo 
uprooted entire Somali Bantu communities, relocated them onto plantation 
estates, and, essentially, created a regime of slavery.18 Kolonyo remained part 
of the Somali establishment until the British conquered Italian Somaliland in 
the early years of WWII.19 
C. Modern Persecution in Somalia – 1960 to Present 
Despite Somalia gaining independence in 1960, the Somali Bantu faced 
institutional discrimination under the new Somali government, which was 
run by and for the Majority clans. This new governmental regime regarded 
the Somali Bantu’s Maay Maay language as illegitimate and in 1973 estab-
lished the Majority clans’ Maxaa language, which is unintelligible with 
Maay Maay,20 as the only official written Somali language of the nation.21 
The Somali Bantu were widely excluded from government positions, politi-
cal representation, and public services, particularly education and health 
14. Id. at 65. 
15. Lee V. Cassanelli, The Ending of Slavery in Italian Somalia: Liberty and the Control of Labor, 
1890-1935, in THE END OF SLAVERY IN AFRICA 308, 319 (Suzanne Miers & Richard Roberts eds., 1988). 
16. ENO, supra note 6, at 95. 
17. Ken Menkhaus, From Feast to Famine: Land and the State in Somalia’s Lower Jubba Valley, in 
THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND IN SOUTHERN SOMALIA: THE WAR BEHIND THE WAR 133,142 (Catherine 
Besteman & Lee V. Cassanelli eds., 2003). 
18. ENO, supra note 6, at 117. 
19. Menkhaus, supra note 17, at 143. 
20. ENO, supra note 6, at 26. 
21. Cassanelli, supra note 15, at 17. 
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care.22 Starting in the 1970s, the Somali government began a land expropria-
tion campaign of Somali Bantu ancestral lands. Title to this land was given to 
large state farms and absentee Majority-clan supporters of the regime.23 
Since the onset of the civil war in the early 1990s, competing Majority-clan 
warlords have violently exploited Somali Bantu land and labor. As a result, 
many Somali Bantu have fled. And within Somalia, there are currently 2.6 
million internally displaced people.24 
Over a decade ago, Al Shabaab conquered Somali Bantu lands and soon 
began a campaign of slavery, starvation, and persecution against the Somali 
Bantu. This has accelerated their displacement. Al Shabaab’s confiscation of 
agricultural produce and forcible conscription of Somali Bantu boys and men 
to fight against professional soldiers with the African Union Mission to 
Somalia (AMISOM) and the American army is not without precedent.25 Over 
the past few years, Al Shabaab’s loss of territory and ability to attract new 
recruits has compelled it to take this model one step further by kidnapping 
male Somali Bantu children from schools and religious gatherings.26 
This contention is supported by Al Shabaab’s higher defection rates due to 
counter-terrorism efforts by the United States and its partners.27 Parents who 
wish to exclude their children from this recruitment must either pay a hefty 
opt out penalty or face the wrath of Al Shabaab, up to and including 
execution.28 
Due to customary law in Somalia, Al Shabaab cannot easily force Majority 
clan children into battle; there is no such restriction, however, on the forcible 
conscription of the Somali Bantu.29 Regarding the specific duties Al Shabaab 
demands of the children it forcibly recruits, the U.S. Department of State 
reports: 
Al-Shabaab continued to recruit and force children to participate in 
direct hostilities, including suicide attacks. Al-Shabaab raided schools,  
22. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4, at 36. 
23. Menkhaus, supra note 17, at 147. 
24. UN HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR SOMALIA FACTSHEET – June 2018 (2018). 
25. Cassanelli, supra note 15, at 18; ENO, supra note 6, at 173. When Somalia’s president, Siad 
Barre, initiated war with Ethiopia in 1977, his military confiscated Somali Bantu’s surplus harvests and 
“discriminatively conscripted and sent to the war front” Somali Bantu youth to fight on the front lines 
against professional Ethiopian soldiers. 
26. Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, transmitted by Letter Dated 7 October 
2016 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) 
and 1907 (2009), Concerning Somalia and Eritrea Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
Annex VII, ¶¶ 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/2016/919 (Oct. 31, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Monitoring Group Report 
Annex VII]. 
27. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
2017, SOMALIA 42 (2018). 
28. Catherine Besteman & Daniel Van Lehman, Somalia’s Southern War: The Fight over Land and 
Labor in SOUTHERN SOMALIA IN WAR AND PEACE IN SOMALIA 299, 305 (Michael Keating & Matt 
Waldman eds., 2018). 
29. Id. at 305. 
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madrassas, and mosques to recruit children. Children in al-Shabaab 
training camps were subjected to grueling physical training, inadequate 
diet, weapons training, physical punishment, and religious training. 
The training also included forcing children to punish and execute other 
children. Al-Shabaab used children in combat, including placing them 
in front of other fighters to serve as human shields and suicide bomb-
ers. In addition, al-Shabaab used children in support roles, such as car-
rying ammunition, water, and food; removing injured and dead 
militants; gathering intelligence; and serving as guards. The organiza-
tion sometimes used children to plant roadside bombs and other explo-
sive devices. The Somali press frequently reported accounts of 
al-Shabaab indoctrinating children at schools and forcibly recruiting 
students into its ranks.30 
While an overwhelming percentage of Somalis are Muslim, a handful are 
Christian.31 
FREEDOM HOUSE, Somalia Profile, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018: DEMOCRACY IN 
CRISIS (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/somalia. 
Organizations in the West that monitor Christian persecution 
report that over the course of Al Shabaab’s control of Somali Bantu lands in 
southern Somalia, it has murdered and beheaded Somalis for their actual and 
perceived Christian faith.32 
Simba Tian, Somalia: Militants Kill Elderly Christian for Carrying Bibles, COMPASS DIRECT 
NEWS, Sept. 22, 2009, https://www.christianheadlines.com/news/somalia-militants-kill-elderly-christian-
for-carrying-bibles-11608822.html
 
. 
An Al Shabaab commander, Ali Mohamed 
Hussein, stated in 2014 that Somalis returning from the West will be viewed 
as individuals who have given up their religion and are a valid military target. 
He states: 
. . . the diaspora returnees who have been taught garbage, evil and lack 
of religion and are being used to spread evil . . . They are working for 
the infidels and since they are working for the infidels, they are the 
same as the infidels they are working for as far as we are concerned. 
They will be killed and fought against in the same manner.33 
Mary Harper, Somalis Sent Back Home in Fear of al-Shabaab, BBC NEWS, June 16, 2014, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27817431. 
Some Somali experts raise the potential that since the outbreak of the civil 
war, the Somali Bantu have suffered genocide.34 This includes the estimated 
250,000 thought to have died at the outbreak of the war in the 1990s as well 
as a similar number who died of starvation due to Al Shabaab’s denial of 
30. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. AND LAB., supra note 4, at 16. 
31.
32.
33.
34. Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (2014), transmitted by Letter Dated 9 
October 2015 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolutions 
751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), Concerning Somalia and Eritrea Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, Annex VI, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. S/2015/801 (Oct. 19, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Monitoring Group 
Report Annex VI]; Catherine L. Besteman, Genocide in Somalia’s Jubba Valley and Somali Bantu 
Refugees in the U.S. in HOW GENOCIDES END (Soc. Science Res. Council, ed., 2007). 
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food aid in the 2011 drought.35 Not only this, Somali Bantu in IDP camps and 
confined in Al Shabaab-held territory have died of preventable illnesses, star-
vation, and execution. An unknown but growing number of Somali Bantu 
civilians, including children forcibly conscripted into Al Shabaab’s militia, 
have been killed during combat operations.36 
The U.N. Security Councils sums up its assessment of the human rights 
violations against the Somali Bantu as: 
The range of persistent and serious violations experienced by the 
[Somali Bantu] community as documented by the Monitoring Group 
may constitute war crimes in non-international armed conflict and 
crimes against humanity, including with respect to the underlying acts 
of persecution, murder, torture and sexual slavery. The nature and scale 
of the persecution and forced displacement of the [Somali Bantu] com-
munity, coupled with allegations of inward transfer of population to 
lands from which the community has been displaced (yet to be investi-
gated by the Monitoring Group) may also be understood as ethnic 
cleansing.37 
III. GOVERNMENT, TERRORISM AND ETHNIC DYNAMICS IN SOMALIA 
A. Political Landscape in Somalia 
In terms of political rights, civil liberties, and human rights Somalia is con-
sidered extremely weak. Freedom House gives Somalia a country rating of 
7/100, which places it among the bottom eight of the 210 countries surveyed.38 
The international corruption rating organization, Transparency International, 
listed Somalia in 2018 as the most corrupt country in the world, a place 
Somalia has held this entire decade.39 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX - 1995 TO 2018 (2018), 
https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. 
The Fund for Peace, which focuses on 
violent conflict, state fragility, and security and human rights, rated Somalia in 
2018 as the second worst country of 178 states surveyed.40 
FUND FOR PEACE, FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2018 (2018), http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/. 
Since 2008, 
Somalia has held the worst or penultimate position on this index.41 
Somalia is driven by clan allegiances and divided by competing ethnic- 
based regional states and militias that profit from the international assistance 
that follows Al Shabaab terrorist attacks and human rights violations.42 
Amanda Sperber, Somalia is a Country without an Army, FOREIGN POLICY, Aug. 7, 2018, https:// 
foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/07/somalia-is-a-country-without-an-army-al-shabab-terrorism-horn-africa- 
amisom/. 
These 
35. The U.N. Accountability Project – Somalia, Neither Inevitable not Accidental: The Impact of 
Marginalization in Somalia in WAR AND PEACE IN SOMALIA 41, 43 (Michael Keating & Matt Waldman 
eds., 2018). 
36. See 2016 Monitoring Group Report Annex VII, supra note 26, at ¶¶ 7-8. 
37. 2015 Monitoring Group Report Annex VI, supra note 34, at ¶ 27. 
38. FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 31. 
39.
40.
41. Id. 
42.
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ill-gotten profits and open collaboration with Al Shabaab would be jeop-
ardized if there was a functioning central government.43 Reports further 
state that “al Shabaab is ostensibly one with the [Majority clan] popula-
tion, including the government.”44 While advantaged members of 
Somalia’s Majority clans profit from the lawlessness in Somalia,45 the 
Minority groups bear the brunt of the human rights abuses, land expropri-
ation, and deprivation.46 
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) offers scant protection and 
controls little of its territory in Mogadishu. The city is largely controlled by 
militarily powerful business and clan militias. A report by Britain’s Home 
Office describes security there as follows: 
Mogadishu is to some extent under the control of AMISOM/SNA 
[African Union Mission in Somalia/Somali National Army] and al 
Shabaab has no military camps in Mogadishu. The city is, however, 
under constant threat as al-Shabaab has reach inside Mogadishu, and 
the city is by several sources considered as infiltrated by al-Shabaab, 
including Mogadishu International Airport and Villa Somalia [presi-
dential palace].47 
HOME OFFICE, COUNTRY POLICY AND INFORMATION NOTE: SOMALIA (SOUTH AND CENTRAL): 
FEAR OF AL SHABAAB VERSION 2.0, 2018, ¶ 5.1.3 (UK), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/982591/ 
download. 
In addition to controlling little of its own territory, the FGS “did not main-
tain effective control over the security forces and had limited ability to pro-
vide human rights protections to society.”48 The U.S. Department of State 
details the general human rights issues in Somalia that include: 
. . . killings of civilians by security forces, clan militias, and unknown 
assailants, but the terrorist group al-Shabaab committed the majority 
of severe human rights abuses, particularly terrorist attacks on civil-
ians and targeted assassinations. Other major human rights abuses 
included disappearances; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment. Impunity generally remained 
the norm. Government authorities took minimal steps to prosecute 
and punish officials who committed violations, particularly military 
and police officials accused of committing rape, killings, clan vio-
lence, and extortion.49 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. AND LAB., supra note 4, at 36. 
47.
48. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. AND LAB., supra note 4, at 1. 
49. Id. 
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Freedom House grades the democratic freedom of every country according 
to an index accounting for: 1) political rights for minority groups, 2) an inde-
pendent judiciary, 3) due process in civil and criminal matters, 4) protection 
from illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgen-
cies, 5) laws, policies, and practices that guarantee equal treatment across the 
population, 6) freedom of movement, 7) personal social freedoms, and 
8) equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation.50 The or-
ganization gives Somalia a 0/4, its lowest rating, in all eight of these 
categories. 
Due to the government’s lack of control over national security and 
citizen registration, most countries do not recognize Somali identity 
documents, leaving Somalis with few options for travel document verifi-
cation.51 Without a proper ID system within Somalia, alternative meas-
ures are used to verify if one is a native Somali. Reports from Somali 
Bantu deportees indicate that one’s fluency and accent in the Somali lan-
guages of Maay Maay and Maxaa are used by government soldiers, mili-
tiamen and Al Shabaab to help determine if a person is a native Somali. 
Those who intersperse English in their spoken Somali will immediately 
be assumed to have lived in a foreign country. Somali Bantu deportees 
arriving at MIA who are not fluent in Somali, or speak English, report 
they are regarded by airport personnel as being non-Somali and often-
times suspected of being spies. 
B. Somalia as a Terrorist Safe Haven 
The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Terrorism acknowledges that 
while action by Somali and international forces have disrupted terrorist activ-
ities, “Somalia remain[s] a terrorist safe haven.”52 Kidnapping, torture and 
ransom have seemingly developed in recent years into an industry in Somalia 
for cash-strapped security personnel, Majority-clan militias and gangs, and 
Al Shabaab. In the first six months of 2017, UNSOM estimated that Al 
Shabaab kidnapped 216 people, including 70 men women and children in a 
four-day period.53 
C. The Ethnic Dynamics of Insecurity Across Somalia 
In dominant Somali society, the Minorities are not considered “real” 
Somalis and are not accepted in the Majority-clans’ traditional protection 
system known as Xeer.54 According to Menkhaus: 
50. FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 31. 
51. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 27, at 41 
52. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 27, at 40. 
53. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. AND LAB., supra note 4, at 14. 
54. Ken Menkhaus, No access: Critical bottlenecks in the 2011 Somali famine, 1 GLOB. FOOD SEC., 
29, 34 (2012). 
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One of the most troubling but least discussed aspects of Somalia’s 
recurring humanitarian crises is the low sense of Somali social and eth-
ical obligation to assist countrymen from weak lineages and social 
groups. This stands in sharp contrast to the very powerful and non-ne-
gotiable obligation Somalis have to assist members of their own 
lineage.55 
Freedom and security for a Somali depends largely on whether one’s 
clan is powerful enough to secure protection for its members in its re-
gional homeland or occupied region and in a rival clan’s region of influ-
ence. Minorities, including the Somali Bantu, neither have an ethnic safe 
haven, nor the ability to enforce protection of its people in regions con-
trolled by the Majority-clan Somalis.56 The Minorities are native to 
southern Somalia where Al Shabaab and other Majority-clan warlords are 
and have been forcibly occupying Minority lands for decades. Since 
being driven out of Mogadishu and Kismayu by AMISOM, Al Shabaab 
has over the past several years established its base of operations in the 
Somali Bantu’s native regions in the Jubba River Valley.57 The U.S. 
Government describes insecurity there as follows: 
Minority groups, often lacking armed militias, continued to be dispro-
portionately subjected to killings, torture, rape, kidnapping for ransom, 
and looting of land and property with impunity by faction militias and 
majority clan members, often with the acquiescence of federal and 
local authorities. Many minority communities continued to live in deep 
poverty and to suffer from numerous forms of discrimination and 
exclusion.58 
The slave ancestry of some Somali Bantu, including the deportees, further 
marginalizes them among Majority-clan Somalis. Being outside of the tradi-
tional Xeer system means that the Minorities suffer abuse that goes unpun-
ished. A conflict assessment report funded by the U.K. Government outlined 
the security threat to, among others, returnees (refugees) and internally dis-
placed people (IDP), most of whom are from the weaker and unarmed 
Somali Bantu and other Minority groups. For the capital city, Mogadishu, the 
report states that [IDPs are] “very vulnerable to criminal violence and preda-
tion by uncontrolled security forces.”59   
55. Id. 
56. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. AND LAB., supra note 4, at 36. 
57. Id. at 1. 
58. Id. at 36. 
59. KEN MENKHAUS, DANISH DEMINING GROUP, DADAAB RETURNEE CONFLICT ASSESSMENT 2, 
(Aug. 2017). 
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Since about 2015, Al Shabaab and ISIS have stepped up attacks in central 
and northern Somalia, sometimes with child soldiers from southern Somalia. 
The Somali Bantu face harassment when relocating to government or 
Majority-clan militia-controlled areas in Somalia, particularly in the central 
and northern regions where they have even fewer rights and less protection 
than in their native southern regions. 
Kismayu is the largest city in southern Somalia after Mogadishu and 
closest to the Somali Bantu’s native homeland in the Jubba River Valley. 
Kismayu is now under the control of the Jubbaland State, which is led by 
Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe)’s Majority Darood-Ogaden-clan mili-
tia. The Jubbaland State is arguably a kleptocracy, or “militia state,” that 
collaborates with Al Shabaab to break international law through the ille-
gal trade of charcoal60 and sugar,61 diverting international food aid,62 and 
profits from the sale of harvests purchased from Al Shabaab that were 
extorted from Somali Bantu farmers. Furthermore, the U.N. reports 
human rights violations by the Jubbaland State against the Somali Bantu 
as the following: 
the unlawful use of force attributed to the forces of the Interim Jubaa 
[Jubba] administration (IJA), including detentions, unlawful killings 
and torture, were the most frequently alleged. The most common alle-
gation from clan representatives, non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) staff members and members of the government was of assassi-
nations of members of particular clans not allied to the government 
structure (particularly the Bantu, Adjuran and Marehan), often dis-
guised as Al Shabaab killings.63 
United Nations-funded research on living conditions for the Somali Bantu 
in Al Shabaab-held regions revealed that the Somali Bantu there are forced to 
give up their underage boys as fighters and laborers64 and their underage girls 
as sex slaves for Al Shabaab.65 Al Shabaab prevents the free movement of 
Somali Bantu in and out of the Jubba River Valley and punishes, up to and 
including execution, those Somali Bantu caught escaping from or returning 
60. Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (2014), transmitted by Letter Dated 9 
November 2018 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolutions 
751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), Concerning Somalia and Eritrea Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, ¶¶ 170-172, U.N. Doc. S/2018/1002 (Nov. 9, 2018) [hereinafter 2018 Monitoring Group 
Report]. 
61. Jacob Rasmussen, Sweet Secrets: Sugar Smuggling and State Formation in the Kenya-Somalia 
Borderlands 9 (Danish Inst. for Int’l Stud., Working Paper 11, 2017). 
62. Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, transmitted by Letter Dated 7 October 
2016 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) 
and 1907 (2009), Concerning Somalia and Eritrea Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
Annex VI, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. S/2016/919 (Oct. 31, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Monitoring Group Report 
Annex VI]. 
63. 2015 Monitoring Group Report Annex VI, supra note 34, at ¶ 12. 
64. 2016 Monitoring Group Report Annex VI, supra note 26, at ¶¶ 7-8 
65. Besteman & Van Lehman, supra note 28, at 305. 
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to their homes in these Al Shabaab-controlled regions.66 Somali Bantu in the 
diaspora report that their relatives are now kidnapped for ransom by Al 
Shabaab, a tactic that is employed by other Majority-clan armed groups 
against minority families that “are understood to have access to resources ei-
ther directly or through supportive relatives abroad.67 
The Somali Bantu, including some deportees, who did not flee Somalia 
but were driven out of their homes by Al Shabaab or Majority-clan mili-
tias are forced to either live in IDP camps or risk emigration through Al 
Shabaab-held territory to refugee camps in Kenya. A majority of the 
IDPs in southern Somalia are Bantu,68 but the IDP camps are managed by 
Majority-clan Somalis and their militias. Gender-based violence, includ-
ing rape of the female IDPs, is a major problem69 that is perpetrated by 
not only armed militias, but also security forces affiliated with the gov-
ernment.70 Marginalized groups such as the Somali Bantu and IDPs “suf-
fered disproportionately from gender-based violence.71 Extortion by the 
IDP camp managers—or “gatekeepers”—is commonplace, as are restric-
tions on freedom of movement.72 
IV. PROFILE OF SURVEYED SOMALI BANTU DEPORTEES 
Somali Bantu interviewees were asked general demographic ques-
tions as well as ones concerning their experience in Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. For clarity purposes, 20 Somali 
Bantu deportees were accounted for in the survey but only 18 were 
interviewed. 
All Somali Bantu deportees are male. The deportees interviewed ranged in 
age from 23 to 42 years old at the time of removal with a mean age of 28.3 
years. Of those deportees interviewed, just fewer than half were born in the 
Dadaab, Kenya refugee camps. When combined with those who arrived there 
as infants two years of age or younger, the figure is 61.1 percent.73 All have 
family (siblings and parents) legally residing in the United States. Those with 
wives in the United States accounted for just fewer than half of the deportees 
while just over three quarters have children – 37 in total - whom were born in 
the United States.   
66. Id. at 306. 
67. 2015 Monitoring Group Report Annex VI, supra note 34, at ¶ 23. 
68. DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL, DURABLE SOLUTIONS FRAMEWORK - LOCAL INTEGRATION FOCUS: 
LOWER JUBA REGION 9, (2016). 
69. HUM. RTS. WATCH, HOSTAGES OF THE GATEKEEPERS: ABUSES AGAINST INTERNALLY DISPLACED 
IN MOGADISHU, SOMALIA 4 (2013). 
70. Id. at 4. 
71. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4, at 36–37; HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 69, at 4-5. 
72. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 69, at 27. 
73. The Somali Bantu deportees born in Kenya consider that country, and not Somalia, as the one to 
which they should have been deported. 
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All the Somali Bantu deportees arrived legally in the United States as refu-
gees between 2003 and 2006. The deportees’ duration of incarceration in ICE 
custody ranged from one month to 36 months with the mean duration being 
12.9 months. The deportees were all removed from the United States between 
2016 and 2018 with 20 percent having arrived in 2016, 35 percent in 2017, 
and 45 percent in 2018. 
Among the Somali Bantu deportees, just over three quarters are fluent in 
English. Upon arrival in Somalia, just over half say they were fluent in Maay 
Maay, while Zigua, Maxaa and Swahili were each spoken by approximately 
one quarter of the deportees. The highest level of education achieved by two 
thirds of the deportees was less than high school completion, while one third 
either only have a high school diploma/GED or attended/graduated from 
college. 
Of the Somali Bantu deportees surveyed at the time of this writing, just 
fewer than half reached Kenya, while the balance is split between Kismayu 
and Mogadishu. While deportees in Somalia and Kenya are eligible for legal 
immigration status, only one is known to have acquired Somali citizenship 
documents and none have been granted legal refugee status by the UNHCR 
in Kenya.74 This has resulted in onward migrations, in some cases to destina-
tions beyond of Kenya. 
V. SURVEY RESULTS ON THE TORTURE OF SOMALI BANTU DEPORTEES 
This section reports on the Somali Bantu deportee’s experiences with tor-
ture, fear of torture, and protection strategies to escape from torture after they 
arrived at MIA. Of the 20 Somali Bantu deportees who were removed to 
Somalia, 55 percent were physically tortured with a 50 percent torture rate 
for those deported in 2016, 42.9 percent for those deported in 2017, and 66.7 
percent for those deported in 2018. Survey results show that at least two 
Somali Bantu deportees were kidnapped and tortured more than once in 
Somalia. 
All 18 of the deportees interviewed responded that they feared for their 
lives at some time while in Somalia with 94.4 percent of them stating they 
feared for their lives at MIA and 88.2 percent in the City of Mogadishu. Of 
the 13 deportees who made it to Kismayu, 92.3 percent said they feared for 
their lives while 100 percent of the nine deportees who escaped through Al 
Shabaab-held territory feared for their lives. 
Of the 13 instances of detention, kidnapping and torture for ransom of 
Somali Bantu deportees, 61.5 percent were carried out by one or more uni-
formed Somali government security personnel. Of the seven instances at  
74. UNHCR refugee camp administrators in Kenya denied Somali Bantu deportees’ requests for ref-
ugee status and ration cards. 
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MIA, uniformed Somali government security personnel were responsible for 
57.1 percent of the abductions. Of the four instances in Mogadishu, uni-
formed Somali security personnel were responsible for 75 percent of the 
abductions and torture. Of the two instances in Kismayu, uniformed Somali 
security personnel were responsible for fifty percent of the abductions and 
torture. 
A. Mogadishu International Airport 
Of the 20 Somali Bantu deportees who arrived at MIA, 10 percent were 
met at the airport by friends or relatives. In response to the question “how 
were you treated at MIA customs,” 11.1 percent of the 18 Somali Bantu 
deportees interviewed reported that they were professionally processed. Of 
the 20 deportees, 90 percent experienced oral or physical abuse, detention for 
more than one hour, forcible payment of a bribe, interrogation, torture, or 
forcible payment of a ransom by uniformed Somali security personnel sta-
tioned at the airport.75 In response to the question “how were the Somali 
deportees from the Majority clans treated at MIA,” 88.9 percent of the 18 
Somali Bantu deportees answered “professionally processed.” The Somali 
Bantu deportees added that the Majority-clan Somalis were largely wel-
comed by the Somali customs officials and were received at the airport by 
family and friends. 
B. The City of Mogadishu 
In response to the question “did any of the following happen to you in the 
city of Mogadishu,” 100 percent of the 18 Somali Bantu deportees reported 
that they were orally or physically abused, detained for more than four hours, 
forced to pay a bribe, interrogated, kidnapped, tortured, or forced to pay ran-
som. Of the 13 Somali Bantu deportees who fled Mogadishu, 100 percent 
stated their reason as wanting to avoid being abused, tortured, and murdered. 
All the deportees offered that they wanted to leave Somalia altogether in 
order to reach Kenya. 
C. Safe-Haven Options in Somalia 
None of the 16 Somali Bantu deportees questioned said they consid-
ered traveling north from Mogadishu to the central and northern regions 
of Somalia where the Galmudug, Puntland and Somaliland regional gov-
ernments are in control. None of the Somali Bantu deportees reported 
that they in fact fled Mogadishu to these central and northern regions in  
75. One Somali Bantu deportee who was later tortured noted that “it seemed like they knew we were 
coming and were prepared to kidnap us.” A second deportee added that his family in the United States 
started to receive ransom requests from the kidnappers one month before he arrived in Somalia and for a 
few months after his family paid a ransom freeing him from his kidnappers. 
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Somalia.76 Of the 16 Somali Bantu deportees’ reasons for not wanting to 
flee to central and northern Somalia, 76.5 percent answered “fear of being 
tortured,” or “fear of being murdered,” while 17.6 percent said these 
regions were “foreign” to them or they “lack of family/ethnic networks.” 
Many of the deportees offered that the central and northern regions were 
dominated by Majority-clan Somalis whom would treat the deportees as 
bad as or worse than those Majority-clan Somalis in Mogadishu. The 
deportees volunteered that their parents and relatives advised the deport-
ees to flee Mogadishu for Kismayu and then on to Kenya. Of the 18 
Somali Bantu deportees, 83.3 percent reported that they did in fact relo-
cate to Somalia’s southern regions.77 
D. The City of Kismayu 
In response to the question “did any of the following happen to you in the 
city of Kismayu,” the 13 Somali Bantu deportees reported that 66.7 percent 
were either orally abused, physically, abused, detained, forced to pay a bribe, 
interrogated, kidnapped, tortured, or forced to pay ransom. The deportees 
attributed the low rate of abuse in Kismayu to their adaptation of survival 
strategies in Somalia. 
Of the eight Somali Bantu deportees who were abused in the City of 
Kismayu, 50 percent identified their abusers as the Jubbaland State police 
and 50 percent as Al Shabaab. One deportee in hiding offered that three Al 
Shabaab soldiers murdered his cousin as a penalty for not revealing the 
whereabouts of the deportee. A second deportee volunteered that during his 
one week in Kismayu, he witnessed the beachfront execution of two local 
Somali Bantu men. 
In response to the question concerning how they obtained money to sur-
vive in Kismayu, the 13 Somali Bantu deportees reported that 15.4 percent 
earned money from “employment,” 23.1 percent received money from “dis-
tant relatives and family friends in Kismayu,” 46.2 percent received remittan-
ces from “relatives and friends in the United States,” none received 
assistance from “charity organizations,” and 30.8 percent from “begging on 
the streets and in the markets.”78 
Of the nine Somali Bantu deportees who fled Kismayu, 66.7 percent 
reported they did so to “avoid being tortured” or “avoid being murdered”  
76. Some Somali Bantu deportees didn’t know anything about these northern regions or that they 
even existed. 
77. Kismayu is the principal city of Somalia’s southern regions as well as being its main transporta-
tion hub for overland and air travel. The territory between Mogadishu and Kismayu is predominantly con-
trolled by Al Shabaab, so Somali Bantu deportees who could afford the safe passage of a flight to 
Kismayu overwhelming did so. 
78. The Somali Bantu deportees’ employment in Kismayu is informal and intermittent and includes 
such work as washing the feet of Somali worshipers at mosque and lugging commercial goods for vendors 
and customers. 
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while 33.3 percent responded, “transit to Kenya.” In addition to the scripted 
survey responses, the deportees volunteered that they wanted to leave 
Somalia to reach the safety of Kenya where many were born or lived for 
years.79 
E. Escaping to Kenya through Al Shabaab-Held Territory 
Although only nine Somali Bantu deportees in Kenya have so far been 
interviewed, between 10 and 15 are believed to have survived the jour-
ney from Kismayu south to the Kenyan border, all of which is Al 
Shabaab-controlled territory.80 None of the Somali Bantu deportees who 
transited through Al Shabaab-held territory with its multiple armed 
checkpoints reported being tortured, which is not to say none were dis-
covered, tortured and executed. Of the nine Somali Bantu deportees 
interviewed who travelled from Kismayu to the Kenyan border, 100 per-
cent said the organization they feared most was Al Shabaab.81 All of the 
deportees who successfully escaped through Al Shabaab-held territory 
to reach Kenya individually reported they “feared for my life” while on 
the journey.82 
Of the 16 Somali Bantu deportees who responded, 100 percent said they 
wished to return to the United States. In response to the question, “do you 
believe you will return to the United States,” 68.8 percent of the deportees 
responded, “yes.” The reasons most Somali Bantu deportees gave for wanting 
to return to the United States were wishing to see their children and parents 
again and because it is their home. 
F. Remittances and Perceived Wealth of the Somali Bantu Deportees 
In response to the question, were you able to safely receive remittances 
from the Dahabshil in Mogadishu, 11.8 percent of the Somali Bantu deport-
ees responded “yes” while 30.8 percent in Kismayu responded answered 
“yes.”83 The Somali Bantu, especially those believed to have been in the 
United States or even those thought to have relatives in the United States, are 
prime targets for remittance extortion from corrupt police, Al Shabaab, and  
79. Unlike Mogadishu, the primary factor limiting travel from Kismayu south to Kenya is not finan-
cial but rather risk tolerance. In order to reach the border with Kenya, the Somali Bantu deportees must 
risk their lives by attempting to pass undetected through Al Shabaab-held territory. 
80. While there are flights between Somalia and Kenya, the Somali Bantu deportees are precluded 
from legally flying into Kenya and would be detected by Kenyan customs officials at the airport and 
removed back to Somalia. 
81. Since Al Shabaab soldiers had their faces and heads covered, the deportees could not determine 
by physical appearance whether or not the abusers were Somalis from the Majority clans. 
82. The Somali Bantu deportees employed a variety of protection tactics that if discovered by Al 
Shabaab would likely have resulted in torture and execution. 
83. Dahabshil is a Somali-owned international money transfer system similar to the Western Union. 
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other gangs in the business of kidnapping and torture for ransom.84 One 
Somali Bantu deportee wishing to collect a remittance at Dahabshil in 
Mogadishu recounted how his taxi driver alerted Al Shabaab via cell phone 
and then drove to an isolated area where Al Shabaab gunmen were waiting to 
kidnap the deportee. 
G. Description of Torture Tactics 
Of the 20 Somali Bantu deportees included in this survey, 75 percent 
were kidnapped or narrowly escaped kidnapping. The deportees 
described how they were either forcefully abducted from the streets by 
police and armed gangs or deceived into detention by taxi drivers and 
police at the airport or road checkpoints. Throughout their experience in 
Somalia, the deportees describe how they were continually derided for 
being Bantu and for having abandoned Somalia for the United States. 
This oral abuse took place throughout the kidnapping and torture phases. 
The deportees kidnapped off the streets were hooded or forced to the floor 
of the vehicle and driven to rural detention sites outside of Mogadishu 
that they said were operated by Al Shabaab. Deportees deceived into 
detention at the airport or police roadblocks were respectively brought to 
holding rooms at or near the airport or to nondescript building in 
Mogadishu and Kismayu. 
Once the deportees arrived at their torture destination, they were isolated 
from other deportees in individual cells or locked rooms. In cases where Al 
Shabaab were the kidnappers, the deportees were handcuffed or tied to a pole 
or beam to restrict their movement during the interrogation and torture. 
Deportees describe how multiple captors would participate in the torture. In 
addition to the oral abuse described earlier, the torturers would also threaten 
the deportees with execution. The physical torture included beating the 
deportees with truncheons and whip-like weapons made from old vehicle 
tires.85 Additional physical abuse included stabbing the deportees in the back 
with knives.86 In an individual case, more extreme torture tactics were 
described by a deportee. During the torture, the kidnappers told the deportees 
they could save their lives by paying a ransom that ranged from US$200 to 
US$1,500. 
In cases where uniformed Somali government security personnel were the 
perpetrators of torture, the deportees were led into individual rooms where  
84. The other deportees state that in order to safely receive money from Dahabshil in Mogadishu, 
they must find a native or long-time resident of Mogadishu whom can receive the money on their 
behalf. 
85. Two of the deportees appeared to exhibit PTSD-like symptoms from their torture experience 
with one of them having impaired speech and cognition due to his physical abuse. 
86. Deportees offered to send pictures of their stab wounds as proof of their torture. 
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multiple police, some occasionally wearing plain clothes, would beat the 
deportees with the butt of a gun and or a truncheon-like weapon. In two cases, 
the deportees’ dreadlocks were aggressively cut off. Those Somali Bantu 
with tattoos were particularly targeted for oral and physical abuse by the 
police. During this torture process, the police derided the deportees for aban-
doning Somalia and accused them of being Christians or spies for the United 
States. The police demanded ransom payments from the deportees in order to 
secure their release. 
Since the deportees were penniless, they had to call relatives in the 
United States, sometimes using the torturers’ cell phone, requesting ran-
som payments. As poor Somali Bantu families in the United States don’t 
have ready access to hundreds of dollars for ransom, it oftentimes took 
several days for the family to marshal the resources from their local 
Somali Bantu community in the United States. In the meantime, the 
deportees continued to be abused, forced to live in unsanitary conditions, 
and given little food and water to sustain themselves. In some cases, the 
captive deportee reported witnessing the execution of local Somali Bantu 
prisoners who could not come up with the ransom money. Once the ran-
som was paid to the captors, the deportees were again hooded and driven 
into Mogadishu where they were released and told to leave Mogadishu or 
face execution. 
H. Protection Strategies by the Deportees to avoid Recapture and 
Torture 
The Somali Bantu deportees employed strategies to protect themselves 
from further kidnapping and torture. Of the 20 deportees, 75 percent escaped 
Mogadishu for Kismayu, while those without funds to pay for transport to 
Kismayu went into hiding in Mogadishu and disguised themselves as local 
Somali Bantu while in public. Kismayu has a higher Somali Bantu population 
than Mogadishu as well as being on the way to Kenya. Of the 15 deportees 
who fled to Kismayu, 60 percent continued their flight through Al Shabaab- 
held territory to reach Kenya.87 
Most of the deportees reported that they only go out at night so as not 
to draw attention to themselves. The Somali Bantu deportees offered that 
in order to prevent themselves from being detected by hostile Somali 
policemen, Al Shabaab soldiers and their collaborators, the deportees all 
had to take on the mannerisms, dress and language use of the local 
Somali Bantu, many of whom are IDPs. This meant acting and looking  
87. Important factors determining length of time spent in a Somali city are availability of money to 
pay for transportation as well as the presence or not of a distant relative or friend with whom the deportee 
can reside. 
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respectively more submissive and sullied as well as never speaking 
English. 
VI. APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE TO THE DEPORTATION 
OF SOMALI BANTU 
A. Deportations88 
The term “deportation” as used in this article means the formal removal of a person who is 
not a citizen of the United States after a finding that the person violated immigration laws. 
See Deportation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/ 
deportation (last visited Jan. 2, 2019). Before April 1997, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(“INS”) used separate procedures, called “deportation” and “exclusion,” to remove individuals, 
depending on whether the individual had formally entered the United States or not. Id. After April 1, 
1997, the INS was abolished and these procedures were consolidated into a single “removal” 
procedure. See id.; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 304, 110 
Stat. at 3009-587 (codified at sections 239, 240 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229, 1229a (Supp. II 1996)); 
Matter of N-B-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 590, 593 n.1 (B.I.A. 1999). 
of the Somali Bantu to Somalia 
Deportations of individuals under orders of removal are handled by the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement division of the Department of 
Homeland Security. The removal proceedings that precede deportation, 
however, are adjudicated by the Department of Justice through the 
Executive Office of Immigration Review, which encompasses Immigration 
Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals.89 Immigration Courts hear 
evidence and issue removal decisions, which can then be appealed to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals.90 In addition, the Attorney General may 
certify the Board’s decisions to him or herself, and directly issue a decision 
that then binds the Board and Immigration Courts.91 Although the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that “the Board should be accorded Chevron defer-
ence as it gives ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete meaning through a 
process of case-by-case adjudication,’”92 Board decisions that construe im-
migration regulations are reviewable in federal courts, which have not 
hesitated to reverse the Board.93 
The number of Somali Bantu removed from the United States has 
depended in part on the relationship between the United States and Somalia. 
On January 5, 1991, because of the Somali Civil War, the United States 
ended its diplomatic presence in Somalia by closing its embassy.94 
U.S. Relations with Somalia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2019). 
As 
Somalia descended into violence and famine with no recognized government 
in control, the United States slowed deportations of Somalis living in the 
United States. Between 1992 and 1996, the United States deported only two  
88.
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516-17 (2009); see MICHAEL JOHN 
GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32276, THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF 
U.S. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS 7 (2009). 
90. I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998)). 
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1); Negusi, 555 U.S. at 516-17. 
92. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 517; Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425. 
93. See infra Part VI.C. 
94.
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Somali citizens.95 
MMIGR. & NATURALIZATOIN SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1999 Statistical Yearbook of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service at 185 (2002), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_1999.pdf. 
Between 1997 and 2016, the United States deported 
approximately 48 people per year on average,96 
The numerical breakdown is as follows:  
Year Total Removed 
1997 22 
1998 23 
1999 34 
2000 50 
2001 40 
2002 45 
2003 27 
2004 30 
2005 40 
2006 39 
2007 19 
2008 23 
2009 26 
2010 39 
2011 31 
2012 41 
2013 62 
2014 63 
2015 144 
2016 157 
OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2016 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 98, 
101, 104 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2016%20Yearbook%20of%20 
Immigration%20Statistics.pdf; OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2007 Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics 109, 112, 115 (2008), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2007.pdf; IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
1998 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 224 (2000), https://www.dhs. 
gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_1998.pdf. The Department of 
Homeland Security has not yet released the deportation numbers for 2017 at the time of this writing. 
even though there was no 
functioning government in Somalia to give advance consent to these 
deportations.97 
95. I
96.
97. See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005). 
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In January 2013, the United States officially recognized a new Somali gov-
ernment, the Federal Republic of Somalia.98 
Federal Republic of Somalia Re-opens Embassy in Washington, U.S. MISSION TO SOMALIA 
(Nov. 19, 2015), https://so.usmission.gov/federal-republic-somalia-re-opens-embassy-washington/. 
The United States subsequently 
welcomed the first Somali ambassador and sent its Secretary of State, John 
Kerry, to Mogadishu.99 Then, on November 18, 2015, the Federal Republic 
of Somalia reopened its embassy in Washington, D.C.100 Since this reopen-
ing, removals101 of Somali citizens have steadily risen, jumping in 2017 to 
528,102 
Layla Mahmood, Deported from the US to a Somali Danger Zone, BBC NEWS, July 4, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44551333. 
more than triple the number in 2016. 
B. Relief from Deportation 
There are three primary forms of relief103 
See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005) (listing forms of 
relief). This list does not include more specialized or ad hoc forms of relief that may enable individuals 
who are not in removal proceedings to enter or remain in the United States, including Temporary 
Protected Status, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, humanitarian parole, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), and deferred action. See 
The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully 
Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. ____ (Nov. 19, 2014), https://
www.justice.gov/file/179206/download
 
. 
that that can prevent a person 
from being removed to a country where he or she faces persecution or torture: 
asylum,104 withholding of removal,105 and relief under the Convention 
Against Torture.106 All of these forms of relief—save one—have strict eligi-
bility requirements that bar many individuals from accessing them.107 The 
one form of relief that is available to all individuals is “deferral of re-
moval”108 under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the Convention”).109 
98.
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), which tracks the number of removals by coun-
try, defines the term “removal” as “the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or 
deportable alien out of the United States based on an order of removal.” 2016 Yearbook of Immigration 
Statistics, supra note 96, at 109 n.1. 
102.
103.
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). 
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
106. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(4), 208.17(a) (2004). 
107. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(2)(i)(A) (one-year filing deadline for asylum); Negusie v. Holder, 
555 U.S. 511, 513–14 (2009); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“particularly serious crime” bar to asylum); 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (“particularly serious crime” bar to withholding of removal (also known as “restric-
tion on removal”)); Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 339 (B.I.A. 2014) (“particularly serious 
crime” bar to withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture). 
108. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17. 
109.
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Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 1 [hereinafter the Convention]. The Convention 
was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1984 and took effect in 1987 after twenty States ratified it. 
Six years later, the United States followed suit. See Hans Danelius, Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW, 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp.html. Because the Convention was not self-executing, see S. 
REP. NO. 101-30, at 10 (1990) (Exec. Rep.), Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification (1990), the 
United States implemented it by enacting several statutes and regulations, including the regulations at 
Part 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which govern removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R.§ 1208.17 
(2004). 
Courts have not hesitated to reverse the Board’s removal decisions when 
the Board erroneously interprets regulations implementing the Convention. 
Even so, courts often disagree, so the requirements for the Convention may 
vary by jurisdiction.110 To make matters more confusing, where federal 
courts have not spoken, the Board follows its own precedent.111 Below is a 
summary of the basic requirements for relief under the Convention Against 
Torture, including the primary conflicts among courts and the Board relevant 
to Somali Bantu claims under the Convention. 
C. Overview of the Convention’s Requirements 
Unlike asylum, relief under the Convention is mandatory if the 
Convention’s requirements are met.112 To obtain relief, an individual must 
carry his or her burden of proof to establish that he or she will face torture in 
the country of removal.113 “Torture” is defined as follows: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or men-
tal, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punish-
ing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her 
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.114 
The Board and courts have distilled this definition into five broad 
requirements:  
(i) The act must cause severe pain or suffering. The act must be an 
extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment. Torture does not 
include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.115 Although torture can include mental pain or 
suffering, that mental pain or suffering must be prolonged, and 
result from severe physical pain or suffering, mind altering 
110. See infra Part C. 
111. Cf. Matter of D-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 105, 108 (B.I.A. 2017) (“The agency’s interpretation of a 
statute applies, regardless of the circuit court’s contrary precedent, unless “the prior court decision holds 
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for 
agency discretion.”) (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs, 545 U.S 967, 
982 (2005); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012)). 
112. Matter of H-M-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 256, 264 (B.I.A. 1998) (“The Department of Justice, through 
the Attorney General and the General Counsel of the Service, takes the position that the United States has 
a binding obligation under Article 3 of the Torture Convention not to remove an individual to a country 
where he or she will face torture.”). 
113. See infra Part C.1. 
114. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) 
115. Id. § 1208.18(a)(2). 
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substances or similar procedures, the threat of imminent death, 
or the threat that any of these things could be imminently 
inflicted on another person.116  
(ii) The pain or suffering must be intentionally inflicted. Torture 
requires specific intent to inflict such pain or suffering. If the 
pain or suffering is unanticipated or unintended, then the act is 
not torture.117 
(iii) The infliction must be for an unlawful purpose. Unlawful pur-
poses include obtaining information or a confession, punish-
ment for a victim’s or another’s act, intimidating or coercing a 
victim or another; or any discriminatory purpose.118 But an act 
is not torture if it is “inherent in or incidental to lawful sanc-
tions,” including judicially imposed sanctions such as the death 
penalty.119 That said, noncompliance with legal procedures 
does not per se constitute torture, either.120  
(iv) 
 
A public official or other person acting in an official capacity 
must inflict, instigate, consent to, or acquiesce to the pain or 
suffering.121 The public official or other person acquiesces 
when, before the activity constituting torture, he or she is “has 
awareness of such activity and thereafter breach[es] his or her 
legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.”122  
(v) The offender must have custody or physical control of the 
victim.123 
The Board and courts disagree on the scope and meaning of the last two 
requirements (requiring a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity to acquiesce to torture, and requiring the offender to have custody or 
physical control of the victim), so that a person may be eligible for 
Convention relief in one jurisdiction but not another. Because these disagree-
ments are complex, the law governing each requirement and its application to 
the Somali Bantu is separately explored below. 
116. Id. § 1208.18(a)(4); see Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(“We should note . . . that “torture” as defined in the Convention Against Torture as well as in the regula-
tions includes killing whether or not accompanied by other torture—and it is indeed death as well as tor-
ture that the petitioner in this case fears. See 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, Art. 1(1), defining torture to include “any 
act by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted,” and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4)(iii), 
including “the threat [and a fortiori the actuality] of imminent death.”). 
117. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(5). The Board and federal courts have elaborated on this standard, 
explaining that the actor must intend to both commit the act as well as achieve the consequences. Matter 
of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 298 (B.I.A. 2002); Pierre v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
118. Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 298. 
119. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(3). 
120. Id. § 1208.18(a)(8). 
121. Id. § 1208.18(a)(6). 
122. Id. § 1208.18(a)(7). 
123. Id. § 1208.18(a)(6). 
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1. Application of the “Severe Pain and Suffering,” “Intent,” and 
“Purpose” Requirements to the Experience of the Somali Bantu 
There can be little argument that Somali Bantu deportees who are kid-
napped and tortured upon arrival in Somalia meet the first three requirements 
listed above. 
First, an individual would suffer severe physical and mental pain if he or 
she were kidnapped off the street, hooded and forced to the floor of a vehicle, 
isolated in an individual cell, handcuffed to a pole or beam, and threatened 
with execution.124 Further evidence of severe pain and suffering includes any 
PTSD-like symptoms and impaired speech and cognition due to the physical 
abuse.125 Even if the individual somehow did not experience extreme physi-
cal pain or suffering, he or she would experience extreme mental pain or suf-
fering when threatened with death after being kidnapped and tied up. Given 
those circumstances and the fearsome reputation of Al Shabaab as terrorists, 
the individual would likely believe that death was imminent, especially if he 
or she observes the kidnappers kill another victim. These threats would be 
egregious enough to constitute torture.126 
Second, the acts above were intentionally inflicted. Certainly, a claim that 
the individual’s pain or suffering was “unanticipated” or “unintended” would 
be regarded as absurd. The circumstances themselves demonstrate that the 
kidnappers had to intend such pain or suffering: they must inflict it to force 
their victim to comply with their demands, call his family, and frighten them 
into sending money. As noted above, sending large amounts of money is dif-
ficult for the victims’ families; they would need persuasion. Unless the kid-
nappers can persuade the family that their loved one is undergoing severe 
pain or suffering, their ransom request cannot yield results. 
Third, the kidnappers’ purpose is unlawful: they inflict severe pain and suf-
fering to intimidate or coerce their victim’s families into paying a ransom. 
Their purpose is also discriminatory. They target the Somali Bantu because 
the Somali Bantu are a vulnerable and socially reviled population. The 
remaining requirements are more complex and are dealt with below. 
D. The Standard of Proof 
Article 3 in the Convention Against Torture prohibits signatories from 
sending individuals to a country where they would face torture. The standard 
of proof for establishing whether an alien would face torture is in the text of 
Article 3 and the regulations interpreting it, as follows:127 
124. See supra Part V.G. 
125. See supra note 85. 
126. See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that threats must be prolonged 
and egregious). 
127. See Oona A. Hathaway, Aileen Nowlan & Julia Spiegel, Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to 
Torture Under International and Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791, 837 n.27 (2012) (“As stated in 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good 
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No State shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would 
be in danger of being subjected to torture [emphasis added]. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(a) provides the requirements for 
relief (withholding or deferral of removal) under the Convention Against 
Torture as follows: 
In considering an application for [relief] under the Convention Against 
Torture, the immigration judge shall first determine whether the alien 
is more likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal. If the 
immigration judge determines that the alien is more likely than not to 
be tortured in the country of removal, the alien is entitled to protection 
under the Convention Against Torture. . . .128 
Therefore, the regulation interprets the Convention’s standard of proof, 
“substantial grounds” for believing that the individual would be “in danger” 
of suffering torture, to mean the individual must “more likely than not” suffer 
torture if returned to the country. Although courts have historically inter-
preted the phrase “more likely than not” to mean anything over 50 percent,129 
the Seventh Circuit has described how ludicrous such a measurement is, 
where torture is concerned: 
The phrase [“more likely than not”], though repeated in numerous 
opinions . . . cannot be and is not taken literally, and this for several 
reasons: It would contradict the Convention (which as noted above 
requires only “substantial grounds for believing that” if removed the 
alien “would be in danger of being” tortured). It would dictate that 
while an alien who had a 50.1 percent probability of being tortured in 
the country to which he had been ordered removed would be granted 
deferral of removal, an otherwise identical alien who had “only” a 49.9 
percent probability of being tortured would be removed—an absurd 
distinction. And it is not enforceable. The data and statistical method-
ology that would enable a percentage to be attached to a risk of torture 
simply do not exist.130 
The Seventh Circuit has therefore enunciated a different standard that 
hews more closely to the Convention’s text: 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose.’ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 21 
U.S.T. 77, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 . . . .”). 
128. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(a) (emphasis added). 
129. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); Milosevic v. I.N.S., 18 F.3d 366, 372 
(7th Cir. 1994). 
130. Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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All that can be said responsibly on the basis of actually obtainable in-
formation is that there is, or is not, a substantial risk that a given alien 
will be tortured if removed from the United States. As we pointed out 
in Yi–Tu Lian v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir.2004): “How 
one translates all this vague information into a probability that [the 
alien, if removed] will be tortured (remember the test is ‘more likely 
than not’) is a puzzler. Maybe probability is the wrong lens through 
which to view the problem. ‘More likely than not’ is the standard bur-
den of proof in civil cases (the ‘preponderance’ standard) and rarely is 
the trier of fact asked to translate it into a probability (i.e., more than 
50 percent). Maybe some strong suspicion that [the alien] is at risk of 
being tortured if he is [removed] . . . would persuade the immigration 
authorities to let him stay.”131 
Apart from the Eleventh Circuit (in a single, unpublished decision),132 
other circuit courts and the Board continue to apply the “more likely than 
not” or “greater than fifty percent” standard.133 When determining whether 
an individual has carried his or her burden, all relevant evidence must be con-
sidered, including  
(i) 
 
 
 
past torture the applicant suffered;  
(ii) whether the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of 
removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured;  
(iii) gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the 
country of removal, where applicable; and  
(iv) other relevant information regarding conditions in the country 
of removal.134 
Given this guidance, courts have agreed that an applicant can carry his bur-
den with country-conditions evidence alone.135 Therefore, even if the  
131. Id. (emphasis added). 
132. Arguelles v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 661 Fed.Appx. 694, 714 (11th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (Martin, 
J. concurring) (reasoning that the Seventh Circuit’s “substantial risk” standard better reflects the language 
of the Convention Against Torture). 
133. E.g., Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018); Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 128 
(2d Cir. 2005); Hospedales v. Holder, 363 Fed.Appx. 795, 797 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished); Mart v. 
Gonzales, 217 Fed.Appx. 751, 754 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); Matter of J-R-G-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
482, 484 (B.I.A. 2018); Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 211, 218 (B.I.A. 2018). 
134. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3). 
135. Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010); see Mansour v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 230 F.3d 902, 908 (7th Cir. 2000); Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 396, 415 (6th 
Cir. 2007); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 477 (3d Cir. 2003); see Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
at 218 (relying on 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) and Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 
2010) and reasoning that “[s]ince the applicant lacked credibility and the objective evidence in the record 
does not independently establish his claim, he did not satisfy his burden to prove his eligibility for protec-
tion under the Convention Against Torture.”). 
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applicant is deemed not to be credible, he or she may still be able to obtain 
Convention relief.136 
1. Application of the Standard of Proof to the Experience of the Somali 
Bantu 
The survey of the Somali Bantu deported in the last three years is strong 
evidence that they are substantially likely to suffer torture, regardless of 
whether the “more likely than not” standard of proof is applied. Fifty-five 
percent of recent Somali Bantu deported between 2016 and 2018 suffered tor-
ture,137 easily exceeding the “greater than fifty percent” requirement. The 
likelihood of torture appears to be increasing, with 66.7 percent of those 
deported in 2018 experiencing it.138 At least two Somali Bantu deportees 
were kidnapped and tortured more than once, indicating an even higher likeli-
hood of torture. Because this data is narrowly focused and establishes the out-
come for those with very similar circumstances, it is not only relevant to the 
Somali Bantu currently seeking relief under the Convention Against Torture, 
it is highly predictive for them.139 
To establish they meet Convention requirements, the Somali Bantu will 
most likely have to rely heavily on country conditions evidence, especially if 
they have little recent personal experience in Somalia. Some Somali Bantu 
applicants may have experienced torture in the past, which is relevant to the 
likelihood of future torture. But even if a particular applicant has not, he will 
be able to establish that he cannot relocate anywhere in Somalia to escape tor-
ture.140 Indeed, 7 out of the 20 deportees in this study, or 35 percent, could 
not even leave the Mogadishu International Airport without being detained 
and tortured.141 Those who made it out of the airport could not relocate to 
Mogadishu. Four of the deportees, or 20 percent, were kidnapped off of its 
streets and tortured.142 Kismayu is also unsafe. Two of the 13 deportees, or  
136. Kamalthas v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir.2001); Singh v. 
Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 404–06 (6th Cir. 2005); Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 371–72 (4th Cir. 
2004); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2004); Settenda v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 89, 
95 (1st Cir. 2004). 
137. See supra Part V. 
138. See supra Part V. 
139. Cf. Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Second, the BIA did not explain 
how it distinguished Wong’s case from similar circumstances that were found to constitute persecution 
[for purposes of asylum] in In re Chao Qun Jiang, A78 386 894 (B.I.A. Sept. 27, 2006) . . . . We remand 
to allow the Board to address these concerns.”); U.S. v. Gonzalez-Flores, 804 F.3d 920, 927–28 (9th Cir. 
2015) (“In assessing whether the alien carried this burden [of establishing that the Immigration Judge 
would have granted him voluntary departure], we focus on whether aliens with similar circumstances 
received relief.”); Huang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 620 F.3d 372, 386 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Many aliens flee their 
home countries under very similar circumstances that should, in fairness, lead to similar outcomes in their 
asylum petitions.”). 
140. The applicant should not have to establish that relocating is impossible; the ability to relocate is 
just one consideration in determining the likelihood of future torture. Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 
1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015). 
141. See supra Part V. 
142. See supra Part V. 
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15.3 percent, who reached that city were detained and tortured.143 The pro-
cess of relocation to Kismayu is also dangerous, requiring passage through 
territory controlled by Al Shabaab.144 Somali Bantu also cannot relocate to 
the northern or central regions of Somalia, where they lack any protection 
from the Majority clans that control the region, thus exposing them to further 
victimization and torture.145 The Ninth Circuit has noted, “[I]t will rarely be 
safe to remove a potential torture victim on the assumption that torture will 
be averted simply by relocating him to another part of the country.”146 This is 
most certainly true for the Somali Bantu. 
Further, the Somali Bantu should have little trouble establishing gross, fla-
grant and mass violations of human rights in Somalia, especially against 
themselves. As described above, the rise of Al Shabaab, and its control of 
Somali Bantu lands for over a decade, have resulted in slavery and starvation 
of the Somali Bantu. The Somali Bantu’s forced displacement, loss of agri-
cultural land, and the forced conscription of their children147 are clearly gross, 
flagrant, and mass violations of their human rights. In addition, individual 
Somali Bantu applicants will be able to offer evidence in the form of testi-
mony about their personal experience with the marginalization and discrimi-
nation that exemplifies country conditions in Somalia. 
Other relevant information includes whether the Somali Bantu can escape 
to Kenya; whether others can protect them from torture; and whether they 
have financial means to protect themselves against torture. None of these 
alternatives is available to the Somali Bantu. They cannot safely escape to 
Kenya because of Al Shabaab. To travel to Kenya from Mogadishu, deport-
ees must first travel to Kismayu, and then to Kenya. Al Shabaab not only con-
trols much of the territory between Mogadishu and Kismayu, it also controls 
the territory from Kismayu to Kenya.148 While there are flights between 
Somalia and Kenya, Kenyan customs officials would prevent any Somali 
Bantu deportees from entering Kenya because they lack legal authorization 
and would remove them back to Somalia.149 
Other Somalis cannot protect Somali Bantu deportees from torture because 
the Somali Bantu, as minorities, lack access to Xeer.150 Somali Bantu deport-
ees also cannot rely on the local Somali Bantu, who live in the southern 
regions of Somalia controlled by Al Shabaab.151 Finally, the Somali Bantu 
deportees lack financial means to protect themselves against torture. Whereas 
143. See supra Part V. 
144. See supra note 3. 
145. See supra Part V.C. 
146. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005). 
147. See supra Part II.C. 
148. See supra note 3, 5. 
149. See supra note 85. 
150. See supra Part III.C. 
151. See supra Part II.C. 
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wealthy individuals might be able to hire private security firms, Somali 
Bantu deportees have no such financial means. 
E. Infliction, Instigation, or Acquiescence by Public Officials 
Although the Board and courts agree that the Convention requires state 
involvement, they disagree on the contours of that involvement. Most of the 
disagreement centers on three questions: (1) Who qualifies as a “public offi-
cial”? (2) Must public officials be “acting in an official capacity”? and 
(3) When does a public official “acquiesce”? Each of these questions will be 
addressed in turn below. 
1. Who Qualifies as a “Public Official”? 
The primary conflict between the Board and federal courts centers on 
whether a “public official” can be a local government employee, or whether 
that term only applies to the country’s government as a whole. The Board 
examines whether this element has been met by referring to the country’s 
government as a whole: 
The relevant inquiry under the Convention Against Torture, however, 
is whether governmental authorities would approve or “willfully 
accept” atrocities committed against persons in the respondent’s posi-
tion. . . . To suggest that this standard can be met by evidence of iso-
lated rogue agents engaging in extrajudicial acts of brutality, which 
are not only in contravention of the jurisdiction’s laws and policies, but 
are committed despite authorities’ best efforts to root out such miscon-
duct, is to empty the Convention’s volitional requirement of all rational 
meaning.152 
Therefore, the term “public official” cannot include “rogue” officers who 
are corrupt, and whom others in the government denounce.153 It may also not 
include local officials, if the national government has undertaken efforts to 
reform them.154 The First and Fourth Circuit agree.155 The Seventh, Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits do not.156 According to the Ninth Circuit, 
152. Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 283 (U.S. Att’y Gen. 2002). 
153. See id. 
154. See id. 
155. Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2013); Costa v. Holder, 733 F.3d 13, 
17–18 (1st Cir. 2013). 
156. Mendoza-Sanchez v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir. 2015) (“It is irrelevant whether 
the police are ‘rogue’ (in the sense of not serving the interests of the Mexican government). A petitioner 
for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture need not prove that the Mexican govern-
ment is complicit in the misconduct of its police officers. It’s simply not enough to bar removal if the gov-
ernment may be trying, but without much success, to prevent police from torturing citizens at the behest 
of drug gangs.”); Ramirez–Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 901 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is not contrary to the 
purpose of the CAT . . . to hold Mexico responsible for the acts of its officials, including low-level ones, 
even when those officials act in contravention of the nation’s will . . . .”); Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 
800 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Avendano–Hernandez was not required to show acquiescence by a 
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The BIA’s “rogue official” rationale is inconsistent with circuit law. 
The BIA held that the danger Barajas-Romero faced from the drug car-
tel and corrupt police did not establish government involvement 
because Mexican law, and national policy to root out the corruption, 
established the absence of official acquiescence. But we held 
in Madrigal v. Holder that “if public officials at the state and local level 
in Mexico would acquiesce in any torture [petitioner] is likely to suffer, 
this satisfies CAT’s requirement that a public official acquiesce in the 
torture, even if the federal government in Mexico would not similarly 
acquiesce.” The four police who tortured Barajas-Romero and told him 
he would be killed if he returned to Mexico were themselves government 
officials. As we held in Madrigal, the “efficacy of the government’s 
efforts to stop the drug cartels’ violence,” not just the willingness of the 
national government to do so, must be examined.49 Here, the BIA focused 
only on the national government’s efforts and not their efficacy, which 
was mistaken under Madrigal.157 
The Seventh Circuit has also made clear that the applicant does not need to 
prove that a particular, individual public official will be directly involved in 
the torture. Rather the government as a whole can demonstrate how public 
officials can be implicated: 
The Board stated that W.G.A. had “not indicated that there was any 
involvement of a public official” in “any of the threats directed” at 
him. W.G.A. does not need to show that a public official was involved 
directly. Perhaps for this reason, the immigration judge and Board 
ignored key evidence on this point too. They did not address the exten-
sive record that describes how corruption, judges’ refusal to protect 
witness anonymity, and the police’s fear of reprisal all allow gangs to 
act with a high degree of impunity.158 
2. Must Public Officials be “Acting in an Official Capacity”? 
According to the Board, public officials must act in an official capacity, or 
in other words, “under color of law.”159 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits agree  
higher level member of the Mexican government because ‘an applicant for CAT relief need not show that 
the entire foreign government would consent to or acquiesce in [her] torture.’ It is enough for her to show 
that she was subject to torture at the hands of local officials.”) (internal citations omitted). 
157. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 363 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Madrigal v. Holder, 716 
F.3d 499, 509 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
158. W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 968 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22, 2018) (citing 
Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
159. Matter of G-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 88, 93 (B.I.A. 2013); Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 280, 
285 (U.S. Att’y Gen. 2002). 
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that officials must be acting “under color of law” as that term is used in the 
civil rights context.160 Therefore, according to the Fifth Circuit, 
[A]n act is under color of law when it constitutes a ‘[m]isuse of power, 
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” We have recog-
nized on numerous occasions that acts motivated by an officer’s perso-
nal objectives are “under color of law” when the officer uses his 
official capacity to further those objectives.161 
In its “under color of law” analysis, the Fifth Circuit implicitly rejected the 
Board’s “rogue officer” line of reasoning: 
[P]roving action in an officer’s official capacity “does not require that 
the public official be executing official state policy or that the public 
official be the nation’s president or some other official at the upper 
echelons of power. Rather . . . the use of official authority by low-level 
officials, such a[s] police officers, can work to place actions under the 
color of law even where they are without state sanction.”162 
The Second Circuit nominally follows the Board’s requirement that public 
officials act in an official capacity, but in doing so, emphasizes how rarely the 
“rogue officers” analysis would apply: 
To the extent that the Egyptian police are acting in their official 
capacities—as is strongly suggested by the fact that their goal is to 
extract confessions—then the acts are carried out “by . . . a public offi-
cial . . . acting in an official capacity.” To the extent that these police 
are acting in their purely private capacities, then the “routine” nature of 
the torture and its connection to the criminal justice system supply 
ample evidence that higher-level officials either know of the torture or 
remain willfully blind to the torture and breach their legal responsibil-
ity to prevent it. As two of the CAT’s drafters have noted, when it is a 
public official who inflicts severe pain or suffering, it is only in excep-
tional cases that we can expect to be able to conclude that the acts do 
160. Ahmed v. Mukasey, 300 Fed. App’x. 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“[T]he applicant 
must demonstrate that, if removed to his country of origin, it is more likely than not he would be tortured 
by, or with the acquiescence of, government officials acting under color of law.”); Ramirez–Peyro, 574 
F.3d at 900. 
161. Marmorato v. Holder, 376 Fed. App’x. 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (citations 
omitted). 
162. Id. at 386 (quoting Ramirez–Peyro, 574 F.3d at 901 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 
91, 111 (1945)); and citing Silva–Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 68, n. 7 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that 
an “alien can establish sufficient collusion between groups in the country, or factions within the govern-
ment itself, whose actions are tolerated, if not condoned by those in government.”); Ontunez–Tursios v. 
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 354 (5th Cir. 2002) (considering evidence of acquiescence by low-level officials 
(such as local police) and high-level officials (such as the President of Honduras)). 
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not constitute torture by reason of the official acting for purely private 
reasons.163 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has completely rejected the Board’s analysis, 
concluding that public officials need not be acting in an official capacity at 
all. The Ninth Circuit reasons that “the word ‘or’ between the phrases 
‘inflicted by . . . a public official’ and ‘acting in an official capacity’ can only 
mean that either one suffices.”164 
3. When Does a Public Official “Acquiesce”? 
The Attorney General and the Board have construed the regulatory 
requirement that public officials have awareness of the torturous activity and 
breach their legal responsibility to intervene to mean that public officials 
must approve or “willfully accept” the activity, thus corresponding to the 
Oxford dictionary definition of “acquiescence” as “silent or passive 
assent.”165 Further, the “activity” the official acquiesces to must be the spe-
cific torture that the applicant fears, not just general violence.166 Finally, pub-
lic officials must be more than merely powerless to stop the activity.167 
Every circuit court that has addressed the issue, which is all of them apart 
from the Eleventh, has disagreed. These circuits have implicitly or explicitly 
concluded that public officials need not willfully accept torture; they merely 
need to be willfully blind to it.168 Some circuit courts also disagree with the 
premise that the government must have some power over those inflicting the 
torture: the Seventh Circuit has found governmental powerlessness irrele-
vant, and the Third Circuit has found it relevant, but not dispositive.169 
163. Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (quoted by 
Ramirez–Peyro, 574 F.3d at 904). But see Barwari v. Mukasey, 258 Fed. App’x. 383, 385 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(unpublished) (relying on Khouzam to conclude that rogue officers can carry out torture even when acting 
outside their official capacities). 
164. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 362 (9th Cir. 2017). 
165. Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312 (B.I.A. 2000); Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 
283 (U.S. Att’y Gen. 2002). 
166. Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1313. 
167. Id. at 1312; see Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 283. 
168. Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705–06 (9th Cir. 2010); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 
1186, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining the history of the U.S.’s conditions on the Convention, and the 
U.S.’s revisions removing “knowledge” from its requirements so that officials need only have “aware-
ness” of activities constituting torture); see Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 170–71 (2d Cir. 
2004); Perez v. Loy, 356 F.Supp.2d 172, 177–78 (D. Conn. 2005); Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 
58, 65 (3d Cir. 2007); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 240 (4th Cir. 2004); Hakim v. Holder, 628 
F.3d 151, 156–57 (5th Cir. 2010); Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir. 2006); Lozano-Zuniga 
v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 831 (7th Cir. 2016); Mouawad v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 589, 596 (8th Cir. 2007), 
amended by 485 F.3d 405 (8th Cir. 2007); Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2005). 
169. Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir. 2015); Pieschacon-Villegas v. 
Atty. Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 311 (3d Cir. 2011). But see Ramirez-Peyro v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 637, 639 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (“it is not enough that a government is aware of torture but powerless to stop it”); Garcia- 
Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Evidence that the police were aware of a particu-
lar crime, but failed to bring the perpetrators to justice, is not in itself sufficient to 
establish acquiescence in the crime. Instead, there must be evidence that the police are unable or unwill-
ing to oppose the crime.”). 
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4. Application to Somali Bantu Deportees 
Somali Bantu individuals can establish a substantial likelihood that public 
officials inflicted or instigated their torture. Most instances of detention, kid-
napping, and torture were carried out by one or more uniformed Somali gov-
ernment security personnel.170 Of the seven instances at MIA, uniformed 
Somali government security personnel were responsible for 57.1 percent of 
the abductions.171 Of the 4 instances in Mogadishu, uniformed Somali gov-
ernment security personnel were responsible for 75 percent of the abductions 
and torture.172 Of the two instances in Kismayu, uniformed Somali govern-
ment security personnel were responsible for one of the abductions and 
torture.173 
Further, such public officials would be acting in their official capacities. 
Somali security personnel are stationed at the MIA,174 and control whether 
Somali Bantu returnees are processed like Majority-clan Somalis, or, as was 
the case 90 percent of the time, detained and abused.175 Without the power 
intrinsic in these government positions, they would not be nearly as effective 
in an area as public and visible as MIA. The international airport in 
Mogadishu is a government-controlled facility where uniformed police and 
customs officials are responsible for security. Government officials, who don 
uniforms that “clothe [them] with the authority of state law,”176 abuse their 
power to the detriment of the Somali Bantu. In addition, people in plain 
clothes are able to position themselves in the airport as government officials 
who are responsible for three of the seven, or 42.9 percent, Somali Bantu 
deportees abducted and tortured at or from the airport. To the extent that 
these individuals are impersonating customs officials at MIA, they are doing 
so with the consent of actual public officials. This consent is evident from the 
fact that these plain-clothed individuals are able to detain Somali Bantu 
deportees in the airport, a government-controlled facility. 
Public officials also acquiesced to the kidnapping and torture of the one de-
portee whom Al Shabaab kidnapped off the streets of Kismayu.177 Since 
Somalia is governed by Majority clans, and discrimination is widespread and 
deeply rooted against the Somali Bantu, whether or not specific “rogue offi-
cers” allowed this kidnapping is irrelevant. The bigotry against the Somali 
Bantu demonstrates that the police, like the rest of Somali society, are will-
fully blind to violence against the Somali Bantu. Low-level officers declining 
to oppose crimes against the Somali Bantu by Al Shabaab would be acting no 
170. See supra Part V. 
171. See supra Part V. 
172. See supra Part V. 
173. See supra Part V. 
174. See supra Part V.A. 
175. See supra Part V.A. 
176. See supra text accompanying note 161. 
177. See supra Part V. 
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differently than high-level officers—all form part of the Majority-clan-based 
society that enforces Somali Bantu marginalization.178 
The argument could be made that Somali police and security forces are in 
an ongoing war against Al Shabaab and are simply powerless to stop them. 
Indeed, the Third Circuit addressed a similar claim in Hussein v. Attorney 
General of the United States.179 In that case, the plaintiff, a member of the 
Tuni ethnic group, whom the court noted were disrespected by Majority clans 
and used as slave labor, argued that the Somali transitional government 
would acquiesce to his torture because it comprised former warlords.180 
Further, Islamic zealots would target him because he was a non-observant 
Shiite.181 The Third Circuit affirmed the Board in denying relief, reasoning in 
part that the transitional government would not acquiesce to such torture 
given the plaintiff’s “unsupported references to the general impunity enjoyed 
by militia members and the police.”182 Here, given the high levels of partici-
pation by Somali security personnel in kidnappings and torture,183 there is 
abundant evidence that the Somali government itself is instigating the torture. 
Further, the Somali government acquiesces to the torture of Somali Bantu 
given that this torture is systematic and routine. It involves a consistent meth-
odology of kidnapping at MIA, a location with a strong governmental 
presence.184 
Another possible argument against relief under the Convention could be 
that Al Shabaab targets many individuals whom it views as enemies of its 
extreme religion, including tourists, Westerners, government officials, and 
non-Muslims; therefore, the Somali Bantu are no more likely to be targeted 
than anyone else. The problem with this argument is that it does not address 
governmental willful blindness towards the Somali Bantu. That is, Al 
Shabaab may target many individuals, but they single out the Somali Bantu 
for particularly harsh punishment.185 Similarly, security forces may battle Al 
Shabaab for many reasons, but Al Shabaab’s victimization of the Somali 
Bantu is not one of them. Whereas clan-based networks, which include police 
and security forces, protect others, no one protects the Somali Bantu. 
178. Cf. Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Persecution is something 
a government does, either directly or by abetting (and thus becoming responsible for) private discrimina-
tion by throwing in its lot with the deeds or by providing protection so ineffectual that it becomes a sensi-
ble inference that the government sponsors the misconduct.”) (quoting Hor v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 482, 
485 (7th Cir.2005)). 
179. 273 Fed. App’x 147 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished). 
180. Id. at 154. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 155. 
183. See supra Part V. 
184. Cf. Mendoza-Sanchez v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding governmental acqui-
escence given the routine torture committed by drug cartels); Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the routine nature of torture indicated that higher-level officials in Egypt either 
know of the torture or remained willfully blind to it, and breached their legal responsibility to prevent it). 
185. See supra Part V. 
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F. Custody or Control of the Victim 
The Board has construed the regulation requiring the offender to have cus-
tody or control of the victim as requiring that the public official—the one 
inflicting, instigating, or acquiescing to the torture—have custody or control 
of the victim.186 Several circuit courts have repeated the Board’s construction 
of this regulation without otherwise addressing it.187 But the Ninth Circuit 
addressed it in Azanor v. Ashcroft,188 as follows: 
The Board apparently derived its erroneous state custody requirement 
from a previous decision, In re J–E–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA 2002) 
(en banc), in which it misread INS regulations to require proof that 
petitioners would likely suffer torture “by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custody 
or physical control of the victim,” id. at 297 (emphasis added). The In 
re J–E– standard impermissibly prevents aliens from seeking relief 
under the Torture Convention for claims based on threats of torture 
when not in official custody. Rather than perpetuate the Board’s error 
by deferring to its misinterpretation of section 208.18, we hold that the 
Board abused its discretion by transgressing Congress’s clearly 
expressed intent to protect aliens from nongovernmental acts of torture 
committed with public officials’ consent or knowing acquiescence.189 
In this case, the vast majority of Somali Bantu deportees who suffer torture 
do so either while in the custody or control of public officials or because pub-
lic officials initially took custody of the deportees and then handed them off 
to others who actually conducted the torture. Either way, public officials 
have enmeshed themselves in the abuse. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Somali Bantu deportees are reviled in Somalia and have no standing or 
protection in Somali society. The entire nation of Somalia is on a war footing, 
especially in the south, where there has been a breakdown in civil society 
over the past 25 years. With widespread poverty and no law and order beyond 
ethnic warlords, the Somali Bantu are constantly at risk of predation by 
Majority-clan Somali criminals and police. Since 2016, there has been a rise 
in kidnapping and torture for ransom of local and deported Somali Bantu 
186. Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 291 (B.I.A. 2002). 
187. See Larngar v. Holder, 562 F.3d 71, 79 n.8 (1st Cir. 2009); Oxygene v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 541, 
547 (4th Cir. 2016); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507 (3d Cir. 2012); Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 
1173, 1181 (11th Cir. 2004). 
188. 364 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2004). 
189. Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2004) (granting a petition for review 
when the Board required evidence that public officials were “willfully accepting of the torture of its citi-
zens by a third party”) (citing Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2003)); Ornelas- 
Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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people by Al Shabaab and Somali security personnel, who are members of 
Majority clans. 
The Somali Bantu are the predominant group residing in internally dis-
placed person camps in urban Somalia. They are the primary victims of the 
civil unrest in Somalia and were designated by the American Government 
and the United Nations as a vulnerable ethnic group deserving of protection 
through resettlement in the United States. A recent effort by the Kenyan 
Government to forcibly return Somali refugees—including 50,000 Somali 
Bantu—resulted in an Open Letter of protest to the UNHCR on July 15, 
2016. Twenty-one Somali and western academicians and human rights acti-
vists put their name on this protest letter opposing the repatriation of Somali 
Bantu due to the likelihood of human rights abuses against them should they 
return.190 
Daniel Van Lehman & Catherine Besteman, OPEN LETTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, (Rites in Exile, Nov 9, 2018, 9:55 AM) http://rightsinexile. 
tumblr.com/search/%22somaliþbantu%22. See Appendix. 
As of today, the refugees have not been repatriated. 
The local Somali Bantu people who have relatives in the United States are 
victims of kidnapping for ransom, torture, and execution by armed groups 
who perceive them as an easy target for extortion. Evidence herein from the 
Somali Bantu in East Africa who were deported to Somalia by the American 
government between 2016 and 2018 shows that at least 55 percent of them 
have been kidnapped, detained, and tortured in Somalia. For those who were 
kidnapped, tortured, or narrowly escaped kidnapping, the rate increases to 75 
percent. All Somali Bantu deportees have a credible fear of being tortured. 
So bad is the security landscape in Somalia for the deportees that shortly after 
their arrival in Mogadishu, most of them made the perilous journey to 
Kismayu, with many of them risking their lives escaping through Al 
Shabaab-held territory in hopes of reaching Kenya. There is no safe place 
anywhere in Somalia for these deportees. 
The frequency with which the surveyed Somali Bantu deportees under-
went kidnapping and torture should be determinative in the removal proceed-
ings of other Somali Bantu; they will more likely than not suffer torture if 
removed to Somalia. Of those Somali Bantu individuals who suffered abuse, 
many experienced a similar pattern of kidnapping, torture and payment of 
ransom. Whereas Majority-clan travelers at MIA were processed without 
trouble, the Somali Bantu were detained. Further, Majority-clan deportees 
can rely on clan connections and protection, while the Somali Bantu faced 
marginalization and abuse. Given the similarity between the Somali Bantu 
deportees and Somali Bantu individuals currently facing removal, the survey 
is powerful evidence that Somali Bantu individuals currently facing removal 
warrant relief under the Convention Against Torture. Public officials (Somali 
airport security officials and police) or members of Al Shabaab will intention-
ally inflict or instigate severe pain or suffering for an unlawful purpose: 
190.
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ransom. Public officials also acquiesce to torture inflicted against the Somali 
Bantu deportees by third parties and may even pass information about 
Somali Bantu deportees to these parties. 
Most of the current Somali Bantu deportees are old enough to remember 
their lives in the refugee camps in Kenya, although only a few can recall life 
in Somalia. Those memories, while tenuous, enable some of them to draw on 
assets in Somalia, including distant relatives in East Africa and Somali Bantu 
culture and languages, to protect themselves once they arrive in Mogadishu. 
But in years to come, those Somali Bantu who arrived in the United States as 
infants will lack even these distant memories. Future Somali Bantu removals 
will increasingly be more American and less Somali, and therefore at even 
higher risk of standing out in Somalia, where they can more easily be kid-
napped and tortured for ransom than the current cohort of deportees.   
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APPENDIX: OPEN LETTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
REFUGEES 
We write to express our concern about the fate of Somali Bantu refugees currently 
living in Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. As scholars of and from southern 
Somalia, we implore the United Nations to prevent the refoulement of any Somali 
refugee in Kenya fearing persecution in his or her home country. The refugees partic-
ularly vulnerable to refoulement are the minority farmers from the Juba and Shabelle 
River Valleys known as Somali Bantus. Their home regions in southern Somalia 
have been fought over and controlled by a host of militias, including the Islamic 
Courts Union and Al Shabaab, since the war commenced in the early 1990s. Prior to 
the war, Somali Bantus experienced regular violations of their civil and human 
rights. In recognition of their extreme victimization during the early years of the war 
by occupying militias, 12,000 Somali Bantus were resettled in the United States 
under a P-2 or “persecuted minority group” designation after 2004. During the past 
25 years, the militias occupying southern Somalia and profiting from the control of 
ports and roads have continued to exploit Somali Bantus as slave labor. 
The degree of persecution increased after Al Shabaab imposed its extremist ver-
sion of Islam on Somali Bantus. While the exploitation of the farmers as slave labor 
continues under Al Shabaab, it also murders Somali Bantu men and boys who refuse 
to take up arms against AMISOM, extorts money from Somali Bantus who have fam-
ily in the United States, and amputates, stones to death, and decapitates Somali 
Bantus who are accused of disparaging Islam. This persecution forced a second wave 
of Somali Bantus numbering in the tens of thousands to seek refuge in Dadaab and 
Kakuma. It is also the reason they cannot repatriate to Somalia. Al Shabaab regularly 
executes Somalis whom it suspects of being western or AMISOM spies or having 
collaborated with non-Muslim organizations such as western NGOs and the Kenyan 
government. Somali Bantus do not have the protection of a militarily powerful clan 
in Somalia and are exploited and murdered with impunity by Al Shabaab, as well as 
by other militias. We urge UNHCR to find a safe resolution for Somali Bantus and to 
ensure they are not returned to Somalia against their will. 
Sincerely, 
Catherine Besteman, Francis F. and Ruth K. Bartlett Professor and Chair, 
Department of Anthropology, Colby College 
Ali Jimale Ahmed, Professor and Chair, Department of Comparative Literature, 
Queens College-CUNY 
Omar Abdulkadir Eno, Professor, Atlas University and Portland State University, 
National Somali Bantu Project 
Lee V. Cassanelli, Professor of History and former Director, Africa Center, 
University of Pennsylvania 
Ken Menkhaus, Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Davidson 
College 
Elizabeth Kimball Kendall and Elisabeth Hodder Professor, History, Wellesley 
College 
Mohamed Eno, Dean and Professor, African Studies, St. Clements University 
Laura Hammond, Head and Reader, Department of Development Studies, SOAS 
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Ahmed Samatar, James Wallace Professor and Chair, International Studies, 
Macalaster College 
Mohamed Mukhtar, Professor and Chair of Social and Behavioral Sciences, 
Savannah State University 
Cindy Horst, Research Professor in Migration and Refugee Studies, Peace 
Research Institute Oslo 
Abdi M. Kusow, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Iowa State 
University 
Francesca Declich, Associate Professor, Department of Communication Sciences, 
Humanistic and International Studies and Director, Ethnological Mission in 
Mozambique and Malawi 
Claire Thomas, Deputy Director, Minority Rights Group 
Daniel J. Van Lehman, National Somali Bantu Project, Portland State University 
Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, PhD Candidate, King’s College, University of Oxford 
Stephanie Bjork, Residential Anthropology Faculty, Paradise Valley Community 
College 
Sheiknur Kassim, activist 
Abdulahi Osman, PhD, Independent Researcher 
Anna Rader, PhD, Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS 
Giulia Liberatore, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), 
University of Oxford  
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